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Malpractice on the Sidelines:
Developing a Standard of Care for Team Sports
Physicians
By MORLEY BEN Prrr*
The peculiarities of sports medicine distinguish it from other
areas of medical practice. Professional sports today create tre-
mendous pressures in all aspects of the industry. The athlete
is expected to perform up to or beyond his capabilities regard-
less of physical condition. The professional sports club owner
functions under heavy financial demands to operate a success-
ful enterprise. Caught between these forces, the team physi-
cian must attempt to balance competing interests.
The problem of the team physician is basic: should primary
allegiance be to the employer or to the employee? Further
complicating the situation is the absence of an applicable na-
tionally-recognized standard of care for the team physician.
The absence of this standard leaves the scope of malpractice
liability undefined in this area.
This note first examines the legal standard of care in the nor-
mal doctor-patient relationship' and explores situations where
an employer hires a physician to treat employees.2 The ten-
sions between the professional sports team owners, players,
and their physicians are then distinguished from those be-
tween other kinds of employers, employees, and their doctors.'
The final section reviews legal precedent involving the stan-
dard of care for the professional sports team physician.'
I
Legal Standards
When a physician treats a private patient, a judicially recog-
nized standard of care applies. A physician who undertakes to
* Member, Class of 1980.
1. See text accompanying notes 2-19, infra.
2. See text accompanying notes 20-36, infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 37-81, infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 86-106, infra.
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render services in the practice of his profession indicates that
he possesses the normal degree of skill and knowledge for
members of his profession in good standing in similar commu-
nities.s He has a duty to adhere to that standard of skill and
knowledge in treating his patients.' Where the physician fails
to follow the standard of care, malpractice liability may arise,
based on a theory of negligence' or lack of informed consent.'
To establish a cause of action based on negligence, the pa-
tient must show that injury resulted from the physician's fail-
ure to use "that degree of care and skill ordinarily exercised by
the profession in his own or similar localities." This is accom-
plished by demonstrating that the physician's performance fell
short of the standard through a comparison of the standard in
5. For convenience only the masculine gender will be used throughout this note.
6. Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 1951); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 299A (1965).
7. The elements of an action for negligence are: that the defendant owed plaintiff
a duty; that defendant breached the duty by not adhering to the proper standard of
care; that defendant's negligence was a cause in fact of plaintiffs harm; and that the
defendant's negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
First, the defendant must owe a duty to the plaintiff. The courts have dealt with this
problem by creating a mythical "reasonable person." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS, at 150 (4th ed. 1971). The defendant's conduct must conform to what a
reasonable person would do under like circumstances. The standard imposed must be
an external one based on societal demands of the individual. "Society may require of
him not to be a fool." Id. at 146. The legal effect of a duty was stated in Raymond v.
Paradise Unified School Dist. of Butte County, 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847,
851 (1963), as follows: "An affirmative declaration of duty simply amounts to a state-
ment that two parties stand in such relationship that the law will impose on one a
responsibility for the exercise of care toward the other."
Secondly, if the actor has knowledge, skill or intelligence superior to that of the rea-
sonable person, society will hold him responsible to a higher standard of care. Seavey,
Negligence-Subjective or Objective, 41 HARv. L REV. 1, 13 (1927); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 289, Comment m (1965). A physician who undertakes to render medi-
cal services, even gratuitously, will ordinarily be understood to hold himself out as
having professional skill and knowledge. The physician must have the skill and learn-
ing commonly possessed by members of the profession in good standing. W. PROSSER,
supra, at 162.
The third element requires that the defendant's negligent conduct must have in fact
caused plaintiffs harm. The final element, proximate cause, is not an issue until plain-
tiff has proved that defendant owes a duty; that defendant breached the duty; and that
defendant's negligence was a cause in fact of plaintiffs harm. The determination of
proximate cause involves an evaluation of policy considerations.
8. Carleton, Physician Liability for Adverse Drug Reactions, 24 MED. TRIAL TECH.
Q. 184, 195 (1978). See notes 13-19 and accompanying text, infra.
9. Rodgers v. Lawson, 170 F.2d 157, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1948). See Smith v. Reitman, 389
F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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the patient's locality and the care exercised in the particular
case.'0
This general standard of care and skill has been modified in
the case of medical specialists. In Robbins v. Footer," the
plaintiff instituted a medical malpractice action arising from
the death of a child because of the defendant's alleged breach
of the standard of care for obstetricians. The plaintiffs claim
against Dr. Footer was submitted to the jury based on another
physician's testimony that Dr. Footer had not complied with
the standard of care for obstetric specialists. The District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the "same or simi-
lar locality" rule did not apply to nationally certified medical
specialists. Instead, the court held that "specialists are re-
quired to exercise that degree of care and skill expected of a
reasonably competent practitioner in his specialty acting in the
same or similar circumstances."' 2
Informed consent, the second basis of malpractice liability, is
based upon the fundamental concept that every person of
adult years and sound mind has the right to determine what
shall be done with his body.'3 The circuit court of appeals in
Canterbury v. Spencel4 outlined the principles of the doctrine
of informed consent: the patient must have exercised his free-
dom of choice based on sufficient knowledge of the options
available and the risks attendant upon each option;s the physi-
cian has a duty to inform the patient in laymen's terms of the
dangers inherent in the proposed treatment as well as avail-
able alternatives;' 6 the physician may be liable to the patient if
he fails to disclose the risk involved; 7 evidence must exist to
indicate that if the patient had been informed of the risk, he
would not have chosen this treatment;' and finally, the injury
must have resulted from the treatment.'9
10. Rodgers v. Lawson, 170 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
11. 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
12. Id. at 129. See Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949), which modifies
the general locality rule.
13. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914).
14. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
15. Id. at 780.
16. Id. at 782.
17. Id. at 783-84.
18. Id. at 786-87.
19. Id. The duty owed by the physician arises out of the physician-patient rela-
tionship. 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons §§ 36-37 (1951). The doctor must treat the
patient with proper professional skill. Failure to do so results in a breach of profes-
sional duty to the patient. Johnston v. Sibley, 558 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
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In summary, if the physician treats a private patient, he indi-
cates that he has a degree of skill and knowledge possessed by
other members of his profession in good standing in the com-
munity. If the physician is a specialist, he is governed by a
higher, national standard of care. If the physician fails to meet
the applicable standard of care, malpractice liability may re-
sult, based on negligence or lack of informed consent.
Distinguishable from the usual doctor-patient relationship is
the situation in which an employer hires a physician to treat
employees. 20 The employer's motive is important in determin-
ing the duties and liabilities of the parties. The crucial test is
whether the employer acted in a totally gratuitous manner or
whether the employer's apparently beneficent act was actually
intended to attain some benefit for himself. If the employer
has acted gratuitously, he is not liable. The normal doctor-pa-
tient relationship exists in this case and the physician is liable
if he violates the recognized standard of care. However, if the
employer acts primarily to further his own interests and the
20. A distinction is drawn between situations where a physician is hired by the
employer to examine a job applicant and situations where the physician is hired by the
employer to treat injured employees. A physician is liable for malpractice only where
a physician-patient relationship exists as a result of implied or express contract. John-
ston v. Sibley, 558 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
In suits brought by employees against physicians engaged by employers to examine
employees, courts have indicated either that no doctor-patient relationship exists at all
(Hoover v. Williamson, 236 Md. 250, 203 A.2d 861 (Md. Ct. App. 1964); New York Cent. R.
Co. v. Wiler, 124 Ohio St. 118, 177 N.E. 205 (1931)) or that the relationship is not the
usual doctor-patient one (Ahnert v. Wildman, 376 N.E.2d 1182, 1187 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978);
Lotspeich v. Chance Vought Aircraft, 369 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963)).
Courts have similarly indicated in suits brought by employees against employers
that there is no doctor-patient relationship between an employee and a physician en-
gaged by the employer to examine him. Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 308 N.Y.
116, 123 N.E.2d 801 (1954); Jones v. Tri-State Tel. and Tel. Co., 118 Minn. 217, 136 N.W.
741 (1912).
The courts appear to agree that the examining physician's general duty of care to an
employee or job applicant is different from the duty he owes to his patients. But the
courts are not in accord as to the general duty of care the examining physician owes to
the examinee in such circumstances.
One court has ruled that the examining physician owes the examinee no duty of care
except to avoid injuring him. Lotspeich v. Chance Vought Aircraft, 369 S.W.2d 705
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963). Another court has held that the examining physician owes to
the examinee a duty of reasonable care. Beadling v. Sirotta, 41 N.J. 554, 197 A.2d 857
(1964). A third court has stated that if the physician undertakes to advise the ex-
aminee, he must exercise care under the general rule that one who assumes to act,
even if gratuitously, must act carefully if he acts at all. Hoover v. Williamson, 236 Md.
250, 253-54, 203 A.2d 861, 863 (1964).
The scope of this note is limited to physicians hired by the employer to treat the
employee.
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physician violates the standard of care, the doctrine of respon-
deat superior applies,2 1 and both the employer and the doctor
are liable.2 2
The employer acts gratuitously, for example, where he di-
rects an employee who has sustained an injury to his fingers in
the course of his employment to report to the employer's phy-
sician.2 3 The Arkansas Supreme Court held in this situation
that the normal doctor-patient relationship exists.2 4 The em-
ployer in this situation is not responsible for the physician's
negligence since the physician is acting as an independent con-
tractor, not as an agent of the employer.2 5
The general rule, summarized in Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Mason,2 6 is that where an employer voluntarily provides
medical services for his employees, the employer is only bound
to exercise reasonable care and diligence in the selection of a
physician. If the employer properly exercises this duty, his
responsibility ceases and he is not liable for the subsequent
negligence of the physician."
However, in most cases the employer acts for his own bene-
21. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior a master/employer is liable for the
torts of his servant/employee committed within the course of employment. Usually,
the neglect is that of the employee and the employer is without fault. Under this doc-
trine, the employee's performance of work on behalf of and in place of the employer
will be treated as the act of the employer. Fernelius v. Pierce, 22 Cal. 2d 226, 233, 138
P.2d 12, 17 (1943).
22. See cases collected in Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 564 (1967).
23. The term "gratuitous medical services" can be misleading. It is defined as
services involving no cost to the employer and arising from no contractual or statutory
obligation of the employer. Today an employer will only rarely furnish gratuitous
medical services to an employee. Nominally "free" medical services are offered today
as an inducement to attract employees or as a means to resolve labor-management
contract disputes. See note 27, infra.
24. Smith v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 139 Ark. 32, 212 S.W. 88 (1919).
25. Id.; Timmons v. Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, 45 Ga. App. 670, 166 S.E. 40 (1932).
26. 232 Ky. 237, 22 S.W.2d 602 (Ky. Ct. App. 1929).
27. Although courts are often careless in their use of the words "voluntary" and
"gratuitous," these words should not be used interchangeably. Voluntary providing of
medical services indicates that the employer provided these services of his own choice,
with the possibility of benefiting himself. Gratuitous providing of medical service indi-
cates that there is no benefit to the employer at all. See note 23, supra.
28. There are many examples of cases where it would have been more appropriate
to use the word "gratuitous" rather than "voluntary." E.g., James v. Yazoo & Missis-
sippi V.R. Co., 121 So. 819 (Miss. 1929); Illinois Central Railway Co. v. Moodie, 23 F.2d
902 (5th Cir. 1928); Black Mountain Corp. v. Thomas, 218 Ky. 497, 291 S.W. 737 (1927);
Borgeas v. Short Line R. Co., 73 Mont. 407, 236 P. 1069 (1925); Stage v. Michigan Central
R. Co., 199 App. Div. 615, 191 N.Y.S. 824 (1922); Parsons v. Yolande Coal & Coke Co., 206
Ala. 642, 91 So. 493 (1921). These cases represent situations where at no cost to the
fit. In Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp.,29 the employee sus-
tained an injury to his back during performance of his duties."o
He reported to a medical clinic maintained by the employer
when a physician, employed by the defendant, examined the
employee and diagnosed the injury as minor. The employee
actually had broken his neck. The Knox court held that the
company medical clinic had been established, and the medical
staff employed, to further the employer's own purposes, and
applied the doctrine of respondeat superior.3 '
The doctor's liability, however, is not affected by any deter-
mination of the employer's liability. The physician who under-
takes to provide services to the employee warrants that he
possesses the skill and training required to do the work. The
rationale supporting the Knox holding is that an employer is
responsible for the torts of his agent as a matter of public pol-
icy.32
The standard of care the physician must follow where he is
acting as an agent 3 of the employer is explained in Betesh v.
employee and no obligation to the employer, medical services were provided. See
notes 23 and 27, supra.
In contrast, the court in Belser v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., Inc., 356 So. 2d 659
(Ala. Civ. App. 1978), properly used the term "voluntary." In Belser, the employer pro-
vided medical services for the employee in conjunction with a labor-management con-
tract. Although the services were free and the employer acted voluntarily, the
employer nonetheless benefited by his actions.
As unionism began to develop in the United States in the 1930's, the idea of gratui-
tous medical services disappeared. The lack of vitality of the gratuitous doctrine today
is reflected in the absence of recent decisions relying upon this theory.
29. 158 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1947).
30. Workers' compensation laws are now prevalent in most states. This is an ex-
clusive remedy for the employee which precludes court suits. The validity of workers'
compensation laws has been upheld on the theory that industry should assume liabil-
ity for industrial injuries as part of the cost of production. Union Iron Works v. Indus.
Accident Comm'n, 190 Cal. 33, 210 P. 410 (1922). The primary purpose of the workers'
compensation laws is to insure an injured employee adequate means of subsistence
while he is unable to work. Id.; CAL. LAB. CODE § 3201 (West 1971). Liability for the
employee's injury is imposed on the employer regardless of negligence. CAL. LAB.
CODE § 3600 (West 1978). See text accompanying note 85, infra.
31. 158 F.2d at 975. Accord, Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 149, 157
P.2d 1 (1945); Ebert v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 264 S.W. 453, 458 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924);
Blue Bell Globe Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Lewis, 27 So. 2d 900 (Miss. 1946). See note 21, supra.
32. 158 F.2d at 975.
33. An agent represents another, the principal, in dealings with third persons.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2295 (West 1954). An agent differs from an employee in three basic
ways. First, an agent can act for, and in place of, his principal, whereas an employee
can only act for the employer. People v. Treadwell, 69 Cal. 226, 236, 10 P.2d 502, 508
(1886). Second, while an employee is subject to the absolute discretion and control of
the employer, an agent has a wider degree of discretion in effecting the purpose of the
584 COMM/ENT [Vol. 2
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United States.3 4 As noted in Betesh the majority rule of the
courts that have considered the question 5 is that a physician
who is the employer's agent and acts primarily to protect the
employer's interests must act with care. If he fails to do so, the
employer is liable for injuries."
The disagreement as to the standard of care in this situation
affects the professional sports team physician. In the usual
doctor-patient relationship, the physician must possess skill
and knowledge similar to other members of his profession. His
primary duty is owed to the patient. The physician's duty to
the patient may be altered where he is a third party hired by
the employer to treat employees. In earlier cases, courts drew
a distinction between medical services gratuitously provided
by the employer and medical services supplied for the em-
ployer's benefit. The distinction was critical because in the lat-
ter case both the employer and the physician were liable. In
the former case, only the physician was liable.3 ' However, be-
cause of increased unionization and the advent of workers'
principal. Gipson v. Davis Realty Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 190, 206, 30 Cal. Rptr. 253, 262
(1963).
Applying the elements of negligence to an agent, it is the duty of an agent to exercise
reasonable skill and ordinary diligence, and not to act negligently. Rianda v. San
Benito Title Guar. Co., 35 Cal. 2d 170, 173, 217 P.2d 25, 27 (1950). In entering into an
agency relationship, the principal has bargained for the exercise of all the skill, ability
and industry of the agent. Rubidoex v. Parks, 48 Cal. 215, 219 (1874). In return, the
agent has agreed that he has reasonable skill and will do the work with reasonable
care. Orfanos v. California Ins. Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 75, 80, 84 P.2d 233, 236 (1938); see
note 7, supra.
Furthermore, if the agent is a professional, he is required to exercise the particular
skill to be reasonably expected of such an agent. United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haid-
inger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 594, 463 P.2d 770, 774 (1970). An agent who fails to use
reasonable skill and ordinary diligence is liable for any losses which his principal may
sustain as a result of his negligence (Dahl-Beck Elec. Co. v. Rogge, 275 Cal. App. 2d 893,
899, 80 Cal. Rptr. 440, 448 (1969)) or breach of duty. Rianda v. San Benito Title Guar.
Co., supra at 173.
34. 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974). In Betesh, government doctors failed to inform
the examinee of an abnormal chest X-ray. He was not notified of the abnormality until
called for reexamination six months later. The delay in notifying the examinee re-
sulted in a tumor progressing from a highly curable stage to terminal stage. The court
awarded $100,000 in damages to plaintiff based on medical malpractice.
35. Id. at 246-47; DeZon v. American Pres. Lines, 318 U.S. 660, 668 (1943); O'Donnell
v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 122 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Hamilton v. Standard Oil Co.,
323 Mo. 531, 19 S.W.2d 679 (1929).
36. See AMERICAN MEDICAL AsSOCIATION, OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAJL
CouNeu, at 23 (1969); Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 149, 157 P.2d 1
(1945).
37. See text accompanying notes 6-19, supra.
38. See text accompanying notes 20-36, supra.
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compensation laws plus the unique circumstances of sports
medicine, the loophole of gratuitous services is unavailable to
the team owner.
A salient issue emerges: to whom does the physician owe
his basic duty-the employer or the employee?
II
Distinguishable Pressure From Responsibility
In the intense atmosphere of professional sports, the physi-
cian encounters a medical version of the domino theory. The
lead domino is team management pressuring the coach to win,
the athlete to perform, and the physician to heal the injured
quickly. Aware that his career is threatened by failure," the
coach then exerts his own brand of influence on the athlete
and the team doctor. Finally, the player, apprehensive about
job security, urges the doctor to do whatever necessary to en-
able him to perform.40 Thrust into this situation, the sports
physician is confronted with extraordinary problems. These
are further compounded by the absence of a national standard
of care in the field of sports medicine41 and the conflicting du-
ties owed by the physician to the player and the team. 42
To understand the tensions inherent in the team physician's
position, it is necessary to examine the nature of his role. As a
group, team physicians are practitioners operating in a unique
field. They range from orthopedists to surgeons and are free
entrepreneurs treating a private group of individuals. In the
39. See Underwood, Punishment is a Crime, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 21, 1978 at
36.
40. Maher, Playing with Pain: Medical Abuse or a Badge of Courage? Los Angeles
Times, Aug. 29, 1978, Part III (Sports), at 1, col. 3.
41. Letter from Dr. Frank W. Jobe to author (Nov. 26, 1978). Dr. Jobe, a well-known
sports physician in the Los Angeles area, is the team physician for the California An-
gels professional baseball club. Interview with Dr. Lloyd J. Milburn, team physician
for the San Francisco Forty-Niners professional football team for 26 years, in San Fran-
cisco (Jan. 15, 1979). Interview with Dr. Gordon Campbell, team physician for the San
Francisco Giants, in Palo Alto, California (Oct. 23, 1978). See text accompanying notes
20-36, supra.
42. The courts have not stated whether a team physician is an employee, agent or
independent contractor of the club. In Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595
F.2d 1265, 1276 (3d Cir. 1979), the court suggested in dicta that a team physician per-
forming surgical duties might be an independent contractor. The absence of judicial
rulings and the unique position of sports physicians have left the matter unresolved.
This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this note.
43. The mere fact that team physicians come from a wide range of medical fields
should not prevent the imposition of a uniform standard of care.
586 [Vol. 2
TEAM SPORTS PHYSICIANS
1950's and early 1960's, the quality of care in professional sports
was inadequate because the special problems of the players
were not recognized." Once the unique problems of athletes
were identified, the quality of care the athletes received im-
proved vastly.45
Accompanying the rise in the quality of care has been an ac-
cumulation of problems for the sports physician. He deals
with a mobile team requiring him to practice in many localities
during the course of a sports season. Moreover, the physician
generally does not become involved with the physical
problems of his athletes until after the problems occur.4 6
The issues confronting the sports physician distinguish his
role from that of doctors in other fields. The primary questions
are: Does the team doctor's relation create a true patient-phy-
sician relationship requiring treatment or disclosure of medi-
cal facts? 7 What should be the extent of liability for coaches
or executives who encourage athletes to play with pain or with
pain-killers at the risk of much greater injury?48 May a team
physician compromise his ethical obligations to avoid antago-
nizing management? A larger question then emerges: May a
team physician disregard traditional medical standards at the
expense of serving the "yahoo ethic" of win-at-any-cost? 49
There are no simple answers to these questions; rather, they
require a case-by-case analysis in light of the unique circum-
stances of contemporary sports.
The nature of the relationship between the physician and the
patient is crucial in determining the legal duties owed by the
sports doctor. As previously discussed, it is apparent that in
the context of treating athletes, a doctor-patient relationship
exists. This principle was recognized in Knox, where certain
duties arose on furnishing medical services to employees."
However, the athlete is unlike the typical employee (for exam-
ple, he will only turn to the team physician as a last resort).
44. Interview with Dr. Lloyd J. Milburn, in San Francisco (Jan. 15, 1979).
45. Id.
46. Id. See note 20, supra. The sports physician usually limits his role to the treat-
ment of injuries. He generally does not examine new players or assume a preventive
role.
47. Morris, Doctors and the Sporting Life, 39 INsURANCE COUNSEL JOURNAL 283
(1972); Altman, Patient-Doctor Relationship Is Examined, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1977
(Sports) at A25, col. 3.
48. See Maher, supra note 40, at 1, col. 3.
49. Id.
50. See Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 158 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1947).
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There are also strong outside pressures that disrupt the nor-
mal doctor-patient relationship.
Probably the most unusual pressure upon the athlete is the
pressure to project an image of machismo. Machismo, an exag-
gerated awareness and assertion of masculinity," is an inbred
feature of professional sports which is deeply rooted in the
fabric of American society. The unfortunate result of the
macho influence is reflected in the Bill Walton saga. Walton,
one of the premiere players in the National Basketball Associa-
tion (NBA), was called a malingerer for his refusal to take
pain-killing drugs and perform with a seriously injured foot.5 2
Aside from maintaining at least a fagade of machismo, the
athlete must also contend with coach-imposed pressures.
Coaches are often the primary supporters of this macho image
and regard physicians with suspicion. It is not unusual to find
both the team physician and the player placed in an uncom-
fortable position. For example, Walt Michaels, head coach of
the National Football League (NFL) New York Jets, berated
quarterback Richard Todd in front of the team and said he
would fine the team physician for having admitted Todd to the
hospital without first notifying the club." Nevertheless, a phy-
sician-patient relationship was created when the Jets' team
51. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1977).
52. See Papanek, Off on a Wronged Foot, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 21, 1978, at 20.
Walton believed his injury-a fractured bone in his left foot-might have been avoided
if the Portland team had provided him with proper medical advice and care. He also
charged Portland with misuse of certain pain-reducing drugs. Id. Today Bill Walton is
a member of the NBA San Diego Clippers. However, Walton played infrequently dur-
ing the 1979-80 season because he was plagued by another injury to his left foot. S.F.
Chronicle, Oct. 25, 1979 (Sports) at 65, col. 5.
In the past there was a tendency on the part of the coaching staff to demand that
players continue in spite of injury or be labeled "yellow." The trainer was urged to
tape the athlete up and send him back in, often to the detriment of the player, the team
and the game. O'DONOGHUE, TREATMENT OF INJURIES To ATHLETES, at 4 (3d ed. 1962).
The athlete's ability to play with pain is a badge of courage and is incessantly lauded
by management and fans, and earns the player peer group respect. See Maher, supra
note 40, at 1, col. 3. Dave Meggysey, former St. Louis Cardinal (NFL) linebacker,
summed up the macho image: "It's like the fictitional American soldier played by John
Wayne, who fights on with crippling fatal wounds." Amdur, Once More, Doc, With Feel-
ing, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1974 (Sports), at 41, col. 2.
53. Eskenazi, Michaels Angered by Todd and Jet Doctor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1977
(Sports), at A25, col. 3. The players knew that Michaels did not look kindly on injured
players and that he peered into the trainer's room to see who was receiving therapy.
As a result, even injured players avoided the therapy room in view of the coach's feel-
ings.
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doctor treated Todd. The physician owed his primary alle-
giance to Todd regardless of the urgings of others.
To further stack the dominoes against the athlete, the team
may exert influence on him to do whatever is necessary to per-
form by threatening him with replacement if he does not.54
Management is also able to use public opinion as a coercive
tool against the athlete. The case of Mike Thomas demon-
strates this tactic. Thomas, a running back for the NFL Wash-
ington Redskins, became embroiled in a dispute with team
management over a foot injury he suffered and his subsequent
refusal to take a pain-killer. Instead of remaining a private dis-
pute, it became a media story with the Redskins management
depicting Thomas unfavorably. The Redskins fans booed
Thomas's appearance at a subsequent home game. 5
If the athlete is not sufficiently harried by these pressures,
his teammates and peers can also apply coercive force. For ex-
ample, Fred Patek, starting shortstop for the Kansas City
Royals baseball team, was ridiculed by his teammates for miss-
ing a series of games because of various injuries.56 His fast re-
covery was probably due to this peer group pressure.
Finally, the player is burdened with the problem of job se-
54. According to Derek Dickey, former NBA player:
The Warriors [Golden State ], the Trail Blazers [Portland I-any sports organi-
zation-they'll ask the athlete to take the drugs. -If they think you're not
willing to help the ballelub win by playing with a certain amount of pain, they
no longer can use your services . .. They'll find someone else who is willing to
take the shots and play hurt.
Maher, supra note 40, at 1, col. 3.
55. S.F. Chronicle, Oct. 25, 1978 (Sports) at 60. When professional football fans,
paying as much as $15 a ticket to see an NFL game, learn about the reluctance of an
athlete to perform they become irate. Stung by athletes' exorbitant salaries, which
many people believe result in high ticket prices, fans seek vocal retribution against
these "ungrateful" athletes. See Miller, How Much They Made in the NFL, S.F. Chroni-
cle, Feb. 1, 1979 (Sports) at 45, col. 1. While one might not consider the fans' outcry a
form of pressure, many athletes have fragile psyches easily shattered by disapproval.
56. Black, Whitey, Team Waiting on Fred, Kansas City Star, Sept. 7, 1978 (Sports)
at 12, col. 1. Patek's absence came at a time when the Royals were battling for the
pennant. His teammates, who did not know the extent of his injury, were disgusted at
his reluctance to play. One teammate remarked that there was "no time to feel sorry
for ourselves." Id.; see Maher, supra note 40, col. 3.
A more ludicrous situation occurs where an athlete's teammates presume them-
selves to be physicians and assess the extent of the player's injuries. Richard Todd,
quarterback for the New York Jets, was hospitalized by the team physician after suf-
fering a knee injury. Todd's teammates maligned him, questioning the seriousness of
his injury. One player determined that Todd's knee injury was no different than others
and that hospitalization was unnecessary. See Eskenazi, Michaels Angered by Todd
and Jet Doctor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1977 (Sports) at A25, col. 3.
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curity. No one wants to be a Wally Pipp, first baseman for the
New York Yankees in the 1920's, who took an afternoon off and
was replaced by Lou Gehrig. Gehrig went on to play in 2130
consecutive games as a Yankee first baseman." Although an
athlete may earn a good salary today, if he cannot perform, he
may find himself working as a bartender tomorrow. 58 The posi-
tion of the sports physician, when an injured athlete chooses to
play in hope of retaining his job, is delicate. All the physician
can do is advise. 9
All of these factors affect the nature of the doctor-patient re-
lationship. However, the fact of the relationship exists. The
existence of the influences outside the relationship should not
affect the quality of care or duty to provide it. If the physician
fails to exercise care in treating the athlete, he should be sub-
ject to liability for negligence irrespective of outside influences.
Once the doctor-patient relationship is established, em-
ployer involvement in it becomes particularly pertinent in
ways that may affect treatment. As shown by the Knox case,
the employer is directly liable for the negligent conduct of the
treating physician if the services are provided for the em-
ployer's benefit. 0 The Knox court based its holding on the
public policy argument that the employer is responsible for the
tort of his agent."' This principle is applicable in the employer-
team-physician situation where in the most basic sense the
player is performing directly for the owner's benefit.
An illustration of the influence owner practices may have on
team player treatment is the widespread availability of drugs.
Drugs used by athletes may be broken down into two catego-
ries, restorative drugs and additive drugs. Restorative drugs
are used to restore injured players' natural prowess. They in-
clude painkillers, tranquilizers and the like.62 Additive drugs
57. See Maher, supra note 40, at 1, col. 3.
58. Underwood, Speed is All the Rage, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 28, 1978, at 34.
59. The athlete makes an individual decision. This is similar to a smoker with em-
physema who decides to continue to smoke. The risks are known but the athlete con-
tinues to perform and the smoker continues to smoke. Former San Francisco Forty-
Niner Team physician Dr. Lloyd Milburn stated, "Remember, if an athlete playing with
a weak knee is earning $60,000, he is going to go as far as possible on that knee." Inter-
view with Dr. Lloyd J. Milburn in San Francisco (Jan. 15, 1979).
60. See Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 158 F.2d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1947).
61. Id.




are employed to increase performance beyond natural limits.63
Most prominent of the additive drugs are amphetamines such
as Benzedrine (bennies) and methamphetamine (speed).64
Additive drugs enable the user to remain hyperactive in the
face of fatigue and induce a "sense of excitement and euphoria,
a sort of I-can-lick-the-world high."6 5
Amphetamines create an illusion that the user is exceeding
his normal level of performance.6 6 Side-effects from amphet-
amines are numerous. They include physical and psychologi-
cal addiction and ailments ranging from constipation to
cardiovascular collapse.6 7 Moreover, amphetamines mask fa-
tigue and artificially prolong the period of stress. This in-
creases the strain on physiologic systems already under stress
due to exertion." In this state, the user is more susceptible to
injury.
Assessments of the amount of drug use in professional
sports vary. A former NFL player stated, "If Pete Rozelle, the
[NFL] Commissioner, put a lock on the pill bottle, half the
players would fall asleep in the third quarter .. "6 Others
claim that one-third to sixty percent of a successful NFL team
use amphetamines before a game.7 o Another estimate is that
drug use has been greatly reduced since the 1960's and early
1970's but that the problem has not been solved.7
The use of drugs in sports has generated several suits by pro-
fessional athletes. Ken Mendenhall, former player for the NFL
63. See id. It is the team physician's duty to treat the injured athlete. The team
physician should only use restorative drugs. Two problems arise when the team phy-
sician prescribes drugs for the injured athlete. First, the long-range effect of restora-
tive drug use can be overlooked in the interest of keeping the athlete performing.
Second, additive drugs used by the team physician or by a person under his supervi-
sion may create a false impression in the user's mind and can hide physical injuries
from the player. See text accompanying notes 64-73, infra.
The absence of a standard of care allows the team physician to exercise wide discre-
tion in prescribing drugs. The physician's attitude and beliefs influence the availabil-
ity and use of both restorative and additive drugs. See text accompanying notes 64-73.
64. See Gilbert, supra, note 62, at 32.
65. Id.
66. After taking amphetamines, former New York Yankee pitcher Jim Bouton
thought his pitches were "smoking" until batters began to clobber them. MEDICAL
WORLD NEWs, Nov. 12, 1971, at 23.
67. See Gilbert, supra note 62, at 32.
68. See Gilbert, supra note 62, at 38.
69. C. OLIVER, HIGH FOR THE GAME (1970). Oliver is a former NFL player.
70. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1973, § 5 (Sports) at 59, col. 5.
71. S.F. Chronicle, Sept. 12, 1978 (Sports) at 45, col. 6. See also Gilbert, Problems in
a Turned-On World, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 23, 1969, at 66.
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Oakland Raiders, proved that the team trainer, acting under
the supervision of the doctor, provided Mendenhall with am-
phetamines. He recovered both from the team and from one of
the team doctors.72 Another former NFL performer, Houston
Ridge, was also given amphetamines following an injury. He
settled his suit out of court.
The Mendenhall and Ridge cases illustrate the nebulous role
of the team trainer as well as the employer's inherent responsi-
bility to monitor the trainer's conduct. In both cases, the
trainer dispensed drugs to the injured athlete. Where the
trainer dispenses drugs without the approval of the team phy-
sician, the issue arises whether the owner or the physician or
both should be liable for the trainer's conduct.
Both the owner and the physician should be liable. The own-
er's liability can be predicated on the Knox rationale of re-
spondeat superior. It follows that the physician should be
liable for the tort of the trainer as a matter of public policy,
since the physician has failed to exercise his duty of care in
supervising the conduct of his agent, the trainer.
The final issue poses a clear question of ethics-to whom
does the physician owe his primary allegiance? This ethical di-
lemma has been firmly settled in the legal profession for some
time. A lawyer employed by a third party to render legal serv-
ices to a client must not permit the third party to influence the
lawyer's professional judgment in handling the client's af-
fairs.7 6
The American Medical Association similarly advises that the
interest of the patient is paramount in the practice of
medicine. In its principles of Medical Ethics, it admonishes a
doctor not to reveal confidences entrusted to him unless re-
72. See text accompanying notes 83-87, infra.
73. See text accompanying notes 97-102, infra.
74. See Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 158 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1947).
75. Former Oakland Raider team physician, Dr. L Kendall Small, stated:
Most team physicians disapprove of strong drugs. But the coaches want
them-for some athletes won't play without them. So what's a doctor to do?
Well he just turns his back. The trainer sets out the pills where the athlete
who needs them can see them, and he goes on with his taping.
P. ZIMMERMAN, A THINKING MAN'S GUIDE TO PRO FoOTBAIL (1970).
76. American Bar Association (ABA) Code of Professional Responsibility, Disci-
plinary Rule 5-107 (B) (1979); ABA Standards for the Defense Function 3.5(c) (Ap-
proved Draft 1971).
77. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL 56 (1969).
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quired to do so by law or if necessary to protect the welfare of
the individual or the community." Furthermore, the Code pro-
vides that drugs may only be supplied or dispensed if it is in
the best interest of the patient." This indicates a clear, exclu-
sive duty running from the team physician to his player-pa-
tient.
However, unlike the legal Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, the Principles of Medical Ethics contain provisions that
weaken the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship.
Public figures, including professional athletes, automatically
surrender a portion of their right to privacy since a physician
may disclose to the press certain health information if author-
ized by the patient or the patient's friend or relative.8 0 The
Code vaguely addresses the employer-physician-employee re-
lationship. It states only that a third party has a valid interest
when he provides for the cost of medical care.'
Weakening as they may be in effect, these conflicting princi-
ples still should not alter the basic nature of the physician-pa-
tient relationship. The team physician's paramount obligation
must be to the patient. The physician must not abandon his
duty to the patient by adopting a win-at-any-cost ethic.
In theory, then, it can be said that team physician standards
should be imposed. While there are pernicious forces in the
physician's environment which affect his conduct, he should be
held accountable for bowing to them. In practice, however, the
reality has been much different. The cases that have been




There have been few judicial attempts toward establishing a
standard of care for sports physicians. The vast majority of the
cases are settled out of court or are determined on bases other
than the standard of care. In the larger professional sports
leagues today, court action is almost totally precluded by col-
lective bargaining agreements.
78. Id. at 55.
79. Id. at 49.
80. Id. at 62.
81. Id. at 5.
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Representative of the cases settled out of court is the Dick
Butkus story. In 1974, Dick Butkus, former Chicago Bears NFL
linebacker, filed suit for $1.6 million against the Bears and the
team doctor in Cook County Circuit Court. He charged that
the Bears' physicians and other physicians had negligently
and improperly over-administered various drugs and medica-
tions causing him irreparable damage. Butkus settled for
$600,000.82
Other cases avoid the standard of care issue in reaching a
decision. In Mendenhall v. Oakland Raiders," an NFL player
won a $35,000 jury verdict against the team and one of the team
doctors. The jury agreed with Mendenhall's second cause of
action which alleged that prior to the Oakland Raiders-San Di-
ego Chargers NFL game on October 1, 1972, the team trainer,
acting under the direct supervision of the team doctors, unlaw-
fully recommended and provided Mendenhall with amphet-
amines. As a result of this conduct, Mendenhall, who was
unsure of the risk, was unable to appreciate fully the nature
and consequences of his conduct during the game. As a proxi-
mate result he suffered a trauma to his left knee. In addition,
the complaint alleged that the defendant-physicians failed to
diagnose Mendenhall's injury properly, resulting in a further
and separate injury to his left knee." While the jury verdict
demonstrated disapproval for the physician's conduct, the
court proposed no guidelines to establish a standard of care for
the sports physician.
Instead, the Mendenhall decision focused on the issue of
whether a professional football player or any professional ath-
lete performing in a team situation is an employee or an in-
dependent contractor. This distinction is critical. If the athlete
is an employee he is precluded, under the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, from suing the employer for personal injuries." How-
ever, if the player is an independent contractor he is not barred
82. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1975, § 1 (Sports), at 14, col. 4. See Underwood, supra note
39, at 37.
83. No. 441-241 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County, Sept. 28, 1973).
84. See the Complaint for Damages and for Declaratory Relief filed in the Menden-
hall case on Sept. 28, 1973, and the jury verdict of July 31, 1978.
85. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3201 (West 1971); see note 30, supra. The case of Billy Gam-
brell, a former NFL player, also focused on workers' compensation rather than the
standard of care. Gambrell filed a $2.5 million suit against the Kansas City Chiefs for
injuries he claimed were the fault of the team. A Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the
lower court ruling that the injuries suffered in the 1974 game were covered by workers'
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from bringing suit. 6 Factors in support of Mendenhall's claim
that he was an independent contractor included (1) the right of
control during the off-season, since athletes were free to take
on temporary employment; (2) the unique employment rela-
tionship where, unlike the usual employer-employee situation
in which the employee can quit or be discharged at any time,
the athlete and the team were legally obligated to complete the
contract; (3) the fact that the athlete was employed in a dis-
tinct occupation; and (4) that the playing of professional foot-
ball requires unique skill and ability."
Contract law is another basis which courts use to avoid the
standard of care issue. In a suit for $1.79 million in damages,
former St. Louis Cardinal (NFL) football player Ken Gray
claimed that he was deceptively given drugs which made him
perform "more violently" and also diminished his general
health and "body integrity."" Gray further alleged that the
Cardinals violated his three-year contract by removing him
from the team in 1970 for failing to pass a physical examina-
tion. A St. Louis jury awarded Gray $45,000 plus interest in his
suit against the team for breach of contract."
Today, collective bargaining agreements preclude suits by
players against the clubs and the team physician. Under the
agreements between the National Football League Players As-
sociation and the National Football League Management
Council, an athlete's suit against a physician is precluded by
arbitration.90 The procedure established by these agreements
for injury grievances requires the athlete to file a claim and the
compensation. This precluded Gambrell's suit for personal injuries. N.Y. Times, Feb.
1, 1978, § 2 (Sports) 4t 6, col. 1.
Just last year the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a tort action
brought by Denver Broncos' player Clarence Ellis against the team and the head coach
for knee injuries Ellis sustained in drills following an off-season knee operation. Ellis
v. Rocky Mountain Empire Sports, Inc., 602 P.2d 895 (Colo. App. 1979). The court held
that Ellis was barred both by the National Football League Standard Player Contract
and Colorado's Workmen's Compensation Act.
86. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3353 (West 1971). Johnson v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeals Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 318, 115 Cal. Rptr. 871 (1974).
87. Mendenhall v. Oakland Raiders, No. 441-241 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County,
Sept. 28, 1973), Memorandum of Points and Authorities (Aug. 15, 1974).
88. MEDICAL WORLD NEWs, Nov. 12, 1971, at 23; N.Y. Times, June 15, 1973, § 2
(Sports) at 42, col. 2.
89. Id.
90. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football League Play-
ers Association and the National Football League Management Council (NFLMC)
(Mar. 1, 1977), at 15-18.
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club to respond.9 ' A neutral physician may be called in by the
athlete for consultation.9 2 If the athlete is not satisfied he may
appeal to an arbitrator whose decision is final.9 3
These collective bargaining agreements do not establish a
standard of care for the team physician. They merely require
the physician to determine the necessary medical and hospital
services needed by the injured player.94 There is no statement
about the physician's duty either to the team or to the player.
Other professional sports collective bargaining agreements
are even more nebulous in this respect than the NFL Agree-
ment. Under the NBA Uniform Player Contract, for example,
the club physician is merely required to use his judgment. The
team's obligation is further reduced by workers' compensa-
tion. At most, the professional football and basketball
clauses merely define the contractual obligation of both the
players and management. Although the club is liable contrac-
tually to the injured athlete, the physician's liability is not af-
fected by these clauses. 6
The case that could have been the vehicle to establish a na-
91. Id. at 16.
92. Id. at 17.
93. Id.
94. According to the NFL Player Contract, "If player is injured in the performance
of his services under this contract and promptly reports such injury to the Club physi-
cian or trainer, then player will receive such medical and hospital care during the term
of this contract as the Club physician may deem necessary." Standard Player Con-
tract for the NFL (1977) at 9.
95. The NBA Uniform Player Contract states:
If, in the judgment of the Club's physician, the Player's injuries resulted di-
rectly from playing for the Club and render him unfit to play skilled basket-
ball, then, so long as such unfitness continues, but in no event beyond the
term of one year . . . the Club shall pay to the player the compensation de-
scribed in paragraph 2 of this contract. The Club's obligations hereunder shall
be reduced by any workmen's compensation benefits and any insurance pro-
vided for by the Club .. . and the Player hereby releases the Club from any
and every other obligation or liability arising out of any such injuries.
NBA Standard Player Contract, art. 1, § 2, para. 6b at 4 (April 29, 1976).
96. Under the professional baseball collective bargaining agreements, the contrac-
tual liability is further reduced. The Uniform Player Contract states: "The Player,
when requested by the Club, must submit to a complete physical examination at the
expense of the Club, and if necessary to treatment by a regular physician or dentist in
good standing." Basic Agreement between the American League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs and the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major League
Baseball Players Association, Uniform Player Contract, Regulation 2, at p. 63 (Jan. 1,
1976). The baseball collective bargaining agreement also fails to distinguish between
the initial physical examination of an athlete and the medical treatment of injured
players.
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tional standard of care for sports physicians involved San Di-
ego Chargers (NFL) defensive end Houston Ridge. On
October 1, 1969, in a game involving San Diego and Miami,
Ridge suffered a hip injury. At the time of the injury, Ridge
had taken three Amber tablets (speed and phenobarbital)
given to him by the team trainer.17 Ridge claimed that after
being administered the drug he was sent back into the game.
The subsequent aggravation of the hip injury (a fracture of the
left hip) ended his career.98 Ridge contended that he had been
so high on amphetamines he did not realize he had broken his
hip.99 Ridge's attorney filed a lawsuit alleging malpractice
against the team physician and the trainer on the theory that
"the administration of certain drugs without legitimate medi-
cal purpose amounts to a battery and conspiracy."100 Unfortu-
nately, the case never went to trial.10 Ridge settled out of
court for $260,000.102
Conclusion
The professional sports team physician practices in a realm
different from that of other doctors. The enormous pressures
surrounding the sports physician-patient relationship distin-
guish it from the usual doctor-patient relationship. Drug avail-
ability in professional sports invites abuse and is one reason
why a standard of care for the team physician is needed.
The present approach allows the physician to establish his
97. See Dolson, Shocked at Use of Drugs in Sports? Don't Be Naive, Philadelphia
Inquirer, Sept. 30, 1971 (Sports) at 27.
98. Brady, Rozelle Acts on Drug Use, Dispensing, Washington Post, June 27, 1973,
§ D (Sports) at 3, col. 4.
99. See Underwood, supra note 58 at 35.
100. Dolson, Shocked at Use of Drugs in Sports? Don't Be Naive, Philadelphia In-
quirer, Sept. 30, 1971 (Sports) at 27.
101. See Underwood, supra note 58 at 35.
102. See Maher, supra note 40, at 1, col. 3. This was not the last time the San Diego
Chargers had problems with drugs. In 1974, NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle fined
eight players a total of $15,000, the San Diego football club $20,000 and head coach Har-
land Svare $5,000 for violating NFL drug policies. N.Y. Times, April 27, 1974, § 1
(Sports) at 19, col. 7. While Rozelle declined to state what drug was involved, Svare
claimed it was marijuana. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1974, § 5 (Sports) at 5, col. 4.
But wide receiver Jerry Levias, who was fined $2,000, claimed he was guilty only of
taking amphetamines. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1974, § 2 (Sports) at 56, col. 3. Defensive
lineman Dave Costa, also fined $2,000, claimed that a doctor (unidentified) had per-
suaded him and his teammates to take the pills. The team physician denied any such
action. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1974, § 2 (Sports) at 23, col. 3.
own standard of care.o3 According to two physicians in the
field of sports medicine,10 4 the team doctor's basic responsibil-
ity is to the patient viewed in his role as a player. The rationale
is that the club has a very large investment in the player. By
exercising reasonable care in treating athletes, the physician
assures both a healthy player and a strong investment.
Critics claim, on the other hand, that a doctor cannot serve
both the team and the athlete, and thus he faces a distinct con-
flict of interest.' Former NFL player Bernie Parrish stated:
The doctor is a super-fan who is part of the team. His decisions
are greatly influenced by the need of the team and the desire of
the patient to play. "Let him play and we'll keep a close watch
on him" is too often the decision of the super-fan team physi-
cian. o0
Neither league rules nor judicial guidelines have been estab-
lished for the team physician. Professional sports collective
bargaining agreements also fail to establish a standard of care.
The result is disparity of treatment for the injured athlete.
There is ample authority to suggest that the team physician's
standard of care can be partly based on the standard of care in
the usual physician-patient relationship. The team physician,
who renders services to an athlete, indicates that he possesses
a degree of skill similar to that of other team physicians in
good standing. At the same time, the unique characteristic of
medical practice in professional sports must be recognized.
The standard of care in professional sports medicine can
best be determined under the guidance of medical organiza-
tions, like the American Medical Association. The judiciary
has laid down the basic medical standard of care. It is up to the
medical profession, particularly professional sports physicians,
103. See text accompanying note 41, supra.
104. See text accompanying note 40, supra.
105. See Maher, supra note 40, at 8, col. 1.
106. B. PARRISH, THEY CALL IT A GAVIE (1971). The problem of allowing emotions to
govern conduct is something sports physicians must scrupulously guard against. Dr.
John Finley, former team physician for the National Hockey League Detroit Red
Wings, said:
Exuberance, our own exuberance is something we physicians have to guard
against. Most of us (team physicians) work with teams as sort of a labor of
love, because we are fans. I know I am. I root hard for the Wings. I'm trying to
think of what I can do to help them win. Maybe there is a drug that will help. I
try to watch myself, not let my emotions influence my medical judgment, but it
is something to keep in mind.
Gilbert, supra note 71, at 68, col. 2.
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to mold the standard into applicable guidelines to deter negli-
gent conduct by management and team physicians.
A standard of total liability would best aid the effectuation of
these goals. Under this theory, management would be liable
for the tortious acts of their employees, including coaches, doc-
tors and trainers. Physicians and coaches would also be liable
for the conduct of the trainer. Public policy considerations dic-
tate that these stringent standards be adopted to establish that
the physician's primary duty is to ensure the health of the pa-
tient-athlete and also to curtail the possibility of future negli-
gent conduct by professional sports team physicians.
Postscript
While this note was being published, a Canadian court found
the National Hockey League Vancouver Canucks guilty of neg-
ligence in a professional sports medical malpractice case and
ordered the club to pay Michael Robitaille $348,000 in dam-
ages.'
According to the court's "Reasons for Judgment," Robitaille
signed an NHL contract and left home to play junior hockey at
age 14.2 He began to suffer attacks of anxiety and depression
which continued after he made the NHL, with the New York
Rangers, in 1970.1 While playing with Vancouver in 1976,
Robitaille was hospitalized for psychiatric treatment.4 He re-
joined Vancouver during the 1976-77 season but reinjured his
shoulder.' Vancouver's management maintained that it was all
in his head and insisted that he play or be suspended.'
Robitaille played but complained of neck pains during a Jan-
uary 1977 road trip.7 Robitaille suffered symptoms of spinal
cord disorder but was given only cursory examinations by New
York and Atlanta team doctors and was ignored by the Van-
couver doctor.' Throughout, the Canucks treated him as a per-
sistent complainer with medical problems.'
1. Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey Club, Ltd., No. C782249 (S. Ct. B.C., Dec. 18,
1979).
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 9.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 10.
7. Id. at 11.
8. Id. at 12.
9. Id. at 32.
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On January 19, 1977, Robitaille received a hard check and
was dragged from the ice in a clumsy and reckless manner
which may have aggravated his injury.o The Canuck's doctor
told Robitaille, "Go home to bed and have a shot of
Courvoisier."" The next day Robitaille was in the hospital suf-
fering from a cervical cord contusion.12 Even then, Vancouver
General Manager Phil Maloney called him a "con artist,""
while the team doctor warned that Robitaille would be traded
unless he "got it together again.,"4
Robitaille never played another game. Now 31, he suffers
from a permanent spinal cord injury that causes numbness
and involuntary jerking of his arms and legs and impairs his
sex life, his ability to drive a car and his prospects for retaining
a job.'5
The court awarded Robitaille $435,000 but reduced the award
to $348,000 on the grounds that Robitaille was guilty of contrib-
utory negligence because he might have sought out a private
doctor or refused to play." But the court noted that profes-
sional athletes are discouraged from consulting doctors on
their own and are under pressure to conform to the ethic of not
being a complainer." The court further concluded that the
health of players tends to be subordinated to the team's inter-
ests when these two factors are in conflict." Had reasonable
attention been paid to Robitaille's well-being, the player might
have been spared that injury that has left him permanently
disabled.
10. Id. at 23.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 24.
13. Id. at 28.
14. Id. at 27.
15. Id. at 106.
16. Id. at 42 and 142.
17. Id. at 44 and 70.
18. Id. at 44.
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